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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RIC E. WANGSGARD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, CHIEF, 
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES, 
LICENSE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
No. 860323 
Category No. 13 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Ric E. Wangsgard, appeals from a judgment dismis-
sing Appellant's Petition for Reinstatement of Appellant's Driving 
Privileges and Affirming the Decision of the Driver's License 
Services, Department of Public Safety, suspending Appellant's 
driving privileges pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 
(1953, as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant's driving privileges were suspended pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended) by the Office of Drivers 
License Services, Department of Public Safety. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §41-2-20 (1953, as amended), Appellant appealed the decision 
by petition to the Third Judicial District Court (T.2-6). The 
petition was dismissed after hearing and the suspension of Defen-
dant's driving privileges affirmed (T.42-43a). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the judgment against him reversed and 
the record of the suspension removed from his driving record. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the hearing examiner for the Office of Drivers License 
Services improperly consider evidence of a field sobriety test 
performed by Appellant after the arresting officer threatened to 
take Appellant to jail? 
2. Did the hearing examiner improperly consider the purported 
results of a chemical test without the sufficient foundation neces-
sary to admit said results into evidence? 
3. Was there sufficient, competent evidence presented at the 
Appellant's drivers license hearing to support the decision of the 
hearing examiner to suspend Appellant's driving privileges as auth-
orized by Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended)? 
4. Did the Office of Driver's License Services deny Appellant 
his constitutional and statutory rights by suspending Appellant's 
driving privileges before a decision on the hearing was rendered 
and before Appellant was notified of that decision? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 4, 1966, Appellant was cited for driving under the 
influence of Alcohol (T.149). Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-
2-19.6 (1953, as amended), Appellant and his attorney appeared at 
a hearing before a hearing examiner, held by the Office of Drivers 
License Services for the purpose of determining if Appellant's 
driving privileges should be suspended for three months because 
there existed reasonable grounds to believe Appellant was driving 
under the influence. Also present at the hearing was the arresting 
officer and assisting officers (T.138). 
At the hearing on the matter the hearing examiner received and 
considered certain evidence allegedly representing the results of a 
chemical test, purporting to reflect the blood alcohol content 
level of Appellant at the time of driving (T.138-146). The evidence 
supporting the test result consisted only of the testimony of the 
officer conducting the test and the officer's notation thereof on a 
police report form (T.17, 150a). The officer aid not present 
evidence verifying that the required procedures in administering 
the test were followed, that the intoxilyzer was properly calibrated 
and maintained as required by law (T.108-110). 
To support a finding that the officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe Appellant was operating a vehicle under the influence, 
the peace officer further testified that the Appellant refused to 
submit to certain field sobriety tests and that Appellant only 
submitted to one test after the officer threatened to take the 
Appellant to jail if he would not perform the tests (T.100-107). 
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Appellant was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to submitting 
to the tests (T.100). 
Despite Appellants counsel's timely objections to the receipt 
and admission of this evidence, the hearing officer received it, made 
it part of the record, and based his decision on it (T.127-129; 
132-133; 138-146). The officer also testified at the hearing that 
the vehicle was being driven reasonably and prudently prior to the 
stop with no erratic movements (T.81-82; 90-91), that Appellant's 
balance and speech were normal (T.95), but that he believed the 
Appellant was under the influence and he could arrest for that 
violation based only on the odor of alcohol on Appellant's breath, 
and the presence of purported beer cans in the vehicle (T.97-98). 
After hearing on this matter, the case was taken under advise-
ment. Appellant's driving privileges were subsequently suspended 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-6-19.6 (1953, as amended) 
effective 31 days after his arrest on January 4, 1986 (T.137). The 
suspension was effective February 4, 1986, before a decision was 
made by the hearing examiner based on the evidence presented on 
hearing. Appellant was not sent notice of the decision until 
February 19, 1986 or February 29, 1986 (T.137). Appellant did not 
have a valid driver's license on his person between the actual 
suspension date and the date he received notice. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant contends that the decision of the Office of 
Drivers License was arbitrary and capricious and the Third Judicial 
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District Court erred in affirming that decision for the follow-
ing reasons: The hearing examiner who presided over Appellant's 
suspension hearing improperly considered and based his decision 
upon evidence which should not have been received. Additionally, 
there was not sufficient competent evidence presented at that 
hearing to make a determination that the Office of Drivers License 
Services had the authority to suspend Appellant's driving privileges 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended). 
Appellant further contends that the State of Ltah, by and through 
the Department of Public Safety, Office of Driver's License Services 
violated Appellant's statutory and constitutional rights by suspend-
ing Appellant's license prior to a decision by the Hearing Examiner 
and notice to Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended), 
the Office of Drivers License Services is authorized to suspend a 
person's driving privileges upon a finding that the officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe the person was in violation of §41-6-
^44 (1983). At hearing to determine whether the officer had reason-
able grounds the hearing examiner condisers certain evidence which is 
deemed to be relevant to the officer's decision that the individual 
was driving under the influence. As reflected by the required 
report form submitted to the agency by the officer, this evidence 
can include the driving pattern of the person, his or her physical 
characteristics, and the results of field sobriety tests performed 
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and blood alcohol tests (T.150-151). The admissibility of his 
evidence is not without legal limitations however. The following 
agruments verify certain evidence received by the hearing examiner 
and relied upon in making his decision was improperly admitted and 
without it there was not sufficient evidence to suspend the Appel-
lant's driving privileges. 
POINT I: THE HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY 
CONSIDERED THE RESULT OF A FIELD SOBRIETY 
TEST 
As part of his investigation of this matter, and prior to the 
arrest of Appellant, the arresting officer, Officer Harris, requested 
the Appellant to take certain field sobriety tests (T.65). Upon 
this request the Appellant refused to submit to the field sobriety 
tests (T.65-66, 101). The arresting officer then called a back-up 
officer, Sgt. Whitney, and discussed the Appellant's refusal to 
submit to the tests (T.66, 101). Sgt. Whitney then told the 
Appellant that if the arresting officer had probable cause that he 
had a right to request, Appellant, to take a field sobriety test 
and if he didn't he would be placed under arrest and taken to jail 
(T.121). Only after the Appellant was threatened with jail Appel-
lant started to perform one test, a hand slap test (T.121). Appel-
lant did not complete the test according to the arresting officer 
(T.15). He was then placed under arrest for his refusal to continue 
or complete the tests (T.69, 102). The officer admitted that 
Appellant was not advised of his Miranda rights until after his 
arrest (T.102). The officer further admitted that at the time he 
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requested the Appellant to take the field sobriety test, that 
Appellant would not have been free to leave (T.97) , that Appellant's 
liberty had been restrained (T.98) and his investigation had cen-
tered on the Appellant (T.99). At hearing on this matter the 
arresting officer testified as to the result of the test which was 
partially taken (T.69). The hearing examiner admitted this evidence 
at the hearing, and in part, based his findings on the result of 
Appellant's partial performance on the hand slap test, which he 
described as poor (T.140). 
Appellant submits that the admission of this evidence was in 
error because it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure 
of Appellant's person. 
To Appellant's knowledge, this Court has not as yet subjected 
breath or field sobriety tests to constitutional scrutiny under the 
search and seizure provisions of the Utah or United States Constitu-
tions. This Court has, however, recognized on at least one occasion 
that breath tests may be subject to the search and seizure laws. 
See, American Fork City vs. Cosgrove 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985) (J. 
Zimmerman concurring). A neighboring jurisdiction, Colorado, has 
subjected field sobriety tests to constitutional scrutiny under the 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 16_. at 1075.* By the nature of the tests they can be 
considered searches and seizures of evidence because they involve a 
trespass upon a person which yields evidence of impairment necessary 
to prove the crime. (See American Fork City, supra, Carver, supra). 
The exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of evidence 
*Pec&l% vs. Helm, 633 P.2d 1071 -7-
(Colo. 1981 
obtained through illegal searches and seizures in a criminal pro-
ceeding is equally applicable to civil proceedings in this state. 
State of Utah by and through the Industrial Commission vs. Wasatch 
Metal & Salvage Co. , 594 P.2d 894, Utah 894 (See also Tirado vs. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 689 F.2d 307 (2nd Cir. 1982) for 
the proposition that the exclusionary rule is applicable in civil 
proceedings which result from criminal investigations if the evi-
dence was seized in contemplation of use in a civil proceeding 
because the deterrance purpose of the rule would be served. That 
is clearly the case here where a driver1 s license hearing is col-
lateral to a DUI arrest.) 
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Interpreting both the above Constitutional rights synonomously, 
the Utah Supreme Court has determined all warrantless searches are 
per se unreasonable except the following exceptions: 
They include consent searches, Washington v. Chrisman, 455 
U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982); searches and 
seizures made in hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); searches and seizures of 
contraband in areas lawfully accessible to the public, State 
v. Shreve, Utah, 667 P.2d 590 (1983), seizure of evidence in 
plain view after lawful intrusion, State v. Romero, Utah, 660 
P.2d 715 (1983); searches and seizures incident to lawful 
arrest based on probable cause under exigent circumstances, 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 
685 (1969); State in interest of K.K.C., Utah, 636 P.2d 1044 
(1981). 
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State v, Harris, 671 P.2d 175 at 179 (Utah 1983). 
By the facts of this case and nature of field sobriety tests, 
none of the above-stated exceptions should apply in this case 
except the "consent" exception. A peace officer may have the right 
as part of an investigatory stop to ask a DUI suspect to voluntarily 
submit to field sobriety tests. See Salt Lake City vs. earner, 664 
P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). However, the officer cannot compel the 
person to submit to those tests. Lanford vs. People, 159 Colo. 36, 
409 P.2d 829 (1966). There is no statutory mandate requiring a 
DUI suspect to submit to a field sobriety test in Utah. 
As recognized in the Helm case, supra, the determination as to 
whether the results are admissible as an exception to search and 
seizure laws becomes an issue of whether or not the Appellant 
legally voluntarily consented to perform the field sobriety test. 
Whether consent is voluntary is determined under a totality of 
the circumstances test according to Schneckloth vs. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 1041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In Schneckloth, 
supra, the United States Supreme Court ruled that " . . . the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment require that a consent not be coerced by 
explicit or implicit means by implied threat or covert force." Id, 
at 412 U.S. 228. ". . .[I]f under all the circumstances it has 
appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily — that it was 
coercea by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a 
claim of lawful authority — then we have found the consent invalid, 
and the search unreasonable. Ld. at 412 U.S. 233 (Citation omitted). 
-9-
While custody alone does not establish involuntariness, it is a 
factor to be considered. See United States vs. Watson 423 U.S. 
411, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed. 2d 598 (1976). 
The Utah Supreme Court examined this question of voluntariness 
in State vs. Wittenback 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). In that case the 
Court recognized the State has the burden of showing voluntariness 
with the following factors evidencing lack of duress or coercion: 
"(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 
(2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a 
mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; 
and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer." 
Icl. at 106. 
Applying the above-stated rulings in this case, the circumstances 
under which the Appellant submitted to a field sobriety test were 
clearly involuntary. It is evident from the record of the hearing 
that Appellant was in a custodial situation at the time he agreed 
to perform the hand slap test, because the arresting officer Harris 
stated he would not have allowed the Appellant to leave on his own 
free will at the time the officer requested Appellant to take the 
field sobriety tests (T.97-99). Officer Whitney, the assisting 
officer, told Appellant he had authority to require the test by 
telling the Appellant he had a right to make him ao them or arrest 
him (T.121). There was not a mere request to take them, but an 
explicit threat to Appellant that if he did not ao the tests, he 
would be arrested for failure to comply with their requirements 
(T.121). Appellant was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to 
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the request (T.102). Appellant specifically did not want to co-
operate as evidenced by his refusal to do the tests initially, and 
refusing to finish the test after he started it. 
The record shows the officers exerted a claim of authority 
under the circumstances by which Appellant was coerced to comply. 
The threats of the officer, and prospect of jail were obviously 
the only reason Appellant eventually submitted to a partial test. 
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Appellant's 
submission to the field test should be deemed involuntary. The 
results of those tests were then obtained pursuant to an unlawful 
search and should not have been admitted at hearing on this matter 
to determine if the officer had the grounds necessary for suspension 
of Appellant's driving privileges. The hearing examiner1s consider-
ation of this evidence was arbitrary and capricious under the 
circumstances. 
POINT II: THE HEARING EXAMINER IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED 
THE PURPORTED RESULTS OF A CHEMICAL TEST AND BASED 
HIS DECISION ON THOSE RESULTS ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY 
Incident to Appellant's arrest in the matter, he submitted to 
a blood alcohol test. Appellant submits that the results of the 
test were improperly considered at hearing on this matter. 
Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended) gives the 
Office of Drivers License Services authority to take administra-
tive action suspending a person's driving privileges after submis-
sion to a chemical test "if the person's blood alcohol content is 
.08% or more, or, if the officer makes a determination, based upon 
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reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct 
that the person is otherwise in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§41-6-44." Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44 (1953, as amended) makes 
it unlawful "for any person with a blood alcohol contenc of .08% or 
greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders 
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state". Utah Code Annotated 
§41-6-44 (1953, as amended). B^ the Department of Public Safety, 
Office of Drivers' License Services own regulations (T.9-13), 
unless drugs are involved, the Office of Drivers' License Services 
will only take administrative action to suspend a driving privilefee 
under the statute in cases where the arresting officers report on 
its face, shows a test result of .08% or more by weight of alcohol 
in the blood (T.10-11). The regulations specifically provide 
that if the Blood Alcohol test results are less than .08% any 
administration suspension will not be taken pursuant to driving 
under the influence "per se" suspension, but can be taken under 
Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19 (1953, as amended). Where only drugs 
are involved, the agency, by its own regulations, may take admin-
istrative action based on the officer's report pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §41-21-19.6. The agency's regulations then specifi-
cally require a .08% or more, blood alcohol level reflected on the 
officer's report before the agency will take action ana set a hearing 
under Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amended) unless that 
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report indicates drugs are involved (T.10-11). This has been the 
regular practice of the agency. 
At an administrative hearing in which only alcohol is 
allegedly involved, proof that the test result is .08% or over is 
the most important and relevant evidence used against the person 
accused. In fact, legal evidence that the accused's blood alcohol 
is .08% or over and was driving or in actual physical control of 
a vehicle is all that is necessary to take administration action to 
suspend the license. See Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6(2) and 
Garcia vs. Schwendiman 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1985). If properly 
proven, the blood alcohol is considered "per se" evidence that the 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the accused was under the 
influence. To prove the statutory blooa alcohol content, a 
scientific analysis of the person's blood, urine or breath must be 
made. The Appellant's blood alcohol content in this case, as in 
most DUI cases in this state was measured by chemical breath analy-
sis. To legally introduce a chemical breath analysis into evidence 
certain statutory and administrative requirements must be met. The 
Utah Supreme Court recognized this in Murray City vs. Hall, 663 P.2d 
1314 (Utah 1983). In that case, the Court ruled that the require-
ments of Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.3 (1953, as amended) and 
regulations authorized therein must be met before a breathalyzer 
can be admitted into evidence. The ruling equally applies to the 
intoxilyzer, the breathalyzer's rnoaern counterpart, which was used 
to determine the Appellant's blooa alcohol Level in this case. 
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Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.3 (1953, as amended) provides: 
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemi-
cal analysis of a person's breath including standards of 
training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material 
to prove that a person was driving or in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
driving with a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, 
documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions 
or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument 
used was accurate, according to standards established in 
subsection (1) shall be admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to 
indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under subsection (1) and the conditions of subsection (2) have 
been met, there is a presumption that the test results are 
valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence 
is unnecessary. 
Introduction and admission of blood alcohol breath test results 
in the administrative hearing are subject to meeting these statutory 
criteria because it is material at a drivers license hearing to 
prove the person was driving with a statutorily prohibited blood 
alcohol where a .08% "per seM violation is alleged as in this case. 
Additionally, by its regulations the administrative agency invokes 
its power because of those test results and Utah Code Annotated 
§41-2-19.6(5) (1953, as amended) requires the hearing officer 
consider the test result. The Court in Murray supra made the 
following judicial interpretation of the above-stated statute: 
Section 41-6-44.3 is merely a codification of the findings 
necessary co establish a proper foundation for the introduction 
of breathalyzer evidence. It is a legislative recognition of 
the universal acceptance of the reliability of such evidence. 
Cf. , e.g., People v. Gower, 41 N.Y.2d 117, 397 N.YU.S.2d 368, 
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366 N.E.2d 69 (1977) (discussing the widespread acceptance of 
the reliability of the breathalyzer). The enactment of §41-6-
44.3 evinces an intent by the Legislature to relieve the State 
of Utah and other governmental entities of the financial burden 
of calling as a witness in every DUI case the public officer 
responsible for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer 
equipment. The accuracy of the breathalyzer equipment depends 
on both the proper functioning of the breathalyzer machine 
itself and the proper compounding of chemicals in the ampoules. 
The regulations enacted by the Commissioner of Public Safety 
pursuant to § 41-6-44.3(1) require both a calibration of the 
machine and a testing of the ampoules. Thus, in place of the 
officer's testimony, §41-6-44.3 permits the admission of 
affidavits regarding the maintenance of a specific breathalyzer 
as evidence of the proper functioning of that breathalyzer 
machine and the accuracy of the ampoules. However, prior to 
the acceptance of those affidavits to establish a presumption 
of the validity of the test results, §41-6-44.3 requires an 
affirmative finding by the trial court that (1) the calibration 
and testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules 
were performed in accordance with the standards established by 
the Commissioner of Public Safety, (2) the affidavits were 
prepared in the regular course of the public officer's duties, 
(3) that they were prepared contemporaneously with the act, 
condition or event, and (4) the "source of information from 
which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation 
were such as to indicate their trustworthiness." 
Murray City vs. Hall, supra, 663 P.2d at 1320 (footnotes omitted). 
As stated in the above-stated ruling from Murray, supra, the 
breath testing regulations established by the Commissioner of 
Public Safety require certain procedures be followed to verify the 
accuracy of a breath test (T.158-167). 
They contain in part the following procedure: 
(a) that the procedures outlined in the regulations to operate 
the machine be followed (See T.159). 
(b) The written checklists verifying all of the procedures 
to operate the machine properly be prepared and retained by the 
officer, along with the test record which is generated from the 
machine and internally records the blood alcohol content of the 
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person taking the test (See T.159). 
(c) That the machine be certified on a routine basis not to 
exceed forty (40) days, by using calibration tests and using the 
method and techniques outlined by the Commissioner of Public Safety 
or manufacturer of the machine, and that the results of those tests 
be recorded appropriately (T.160). The Murray/Hall case defined 
what was appropriate certification. An example of those certificate 
forms is contained at (T-12). 
Pursuant to these requirements, in a typical DUI case, the 
following documents are submitted to meet the foundational require-
ments: the operational checklist, the test record, and affidavits 
verifying the certification of the machine before and after the 
test given to the individual DUI suspect. All of these documents 
would contain the serial number of the machine the test was given 
on. Under Murray vs. Hall this documentary evidence is required to 
meet these statutory mandates and admit the test results into 
evidence. 
In this case, no test record was offered or received as evidence 
of Appellant's blood alcohol content (T.17). No operational check 
list was produced or received, and the officer who conducted the 
test admitted he could not independently recall if all the opera-
tional procedures were followed (T.108-110). Only one affidavit 
pursuant to Murray City vs. Hall was received and became part of 
the record (T.196). The only evidence of Appellant's blood alcohol 
content that was given at the hearing was the hearsay statements of 
the officer, and the DUI report form. The report form did not 
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reflect the serial number of the intoxilyzer machine and the officer 
was unaware of the exact number (T.108, 150a). Therefore it was 
impossible to determine if the one affidavit submitted actually 
related to the machine that Appellant took his test on (T.108). 
The hearing examiners findings reflect he used the blood alcohol 
level as a basis for his determination that there was competent 
evidence to suspend Appellant1s license. He recorded on the find-
ings that the purported chemical test result was .14% (T.138a-139). 
The findings also reflect that the officer made a determination 
that all operational procedures and foundational requirements were 
met to insure the proper working order of the intoxilyzer and 
accuracy of the test results (T.139a). The hearing officer there-
fore disregarded the statutory requirements by admitting the results 
of the blood alcohol. It should have been excluded as evidence at 
said hearing then as a statutory violation and inadmissible under 
Murray City vs. Hall, supra. 
Though hearsay evidence is admissible, at administrative 
proceedings, Utah case law suggests that given the requirements of 
due process, the hearsay evidence of the test result given in this 
case is not sufficient. 
The Utah Supreme Court has regularly required documented 
chemical testing as an evidentiary basis for revoking a right or 
privilege when the existence of alcohol is considered the basis for 
revocation. In DeFusion Co. vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980) the Court vacated an order revoking a 
private clubfs liquor license, when the Court took judicial notice 
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that a "screwdriver" contained alcohol, a necessary element of the 
violation. The Court noted that the statutory percentage weight by 
alcohol must be proven and implied that without competent scientific 
documented evidence a revocation based on a finding that alcohol 
was proven was in error. 
In a case nearly identical to DeFusion Co. supra, The Club 
Stanyon Street vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission 615 P.2d 435 
(Utah 1980) the Court also found testimony as to alcohol content 
insufficient to prove the existence of alcohol. In vacating the 
suspensions order of an administrative agency, the Court made the 
following justification: 
The Commission as an administrative body may be justified 
in taking the position that it is not necessarily bound to 
adhere to the technical rules of evidence and procedure as 
applied in the courts. Nevertheless, wherein it is performing 
a duty of a judicial nature in which the findings of facts and 
the adjudication of important rights is involved, care should 
be taken that the procedures should comport with standards of 
fairness and due process. Ri. at 436 (Footnotes omitted). 
Comparatively, in DUI cases where an intoxilyzer result is 
evidence of a blood alcohol level, it is necessary to prove the 
result with the required test record and documents verifying the 
accuracy of the machine. 
Since the Office of Drivers License Services is authorized to 
invoke the administrative process on the mere allegation that the 
suspects blood alcohol is .08% or over and can suspend a driving 
right or privilege on the finding that the blood alcohol was .08%, 
the hearing examiner's error in this case was extremely prejudicial 
to Appellant. It is impossible to determine from the findings 
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what weight the blood alcohol level was given, whether or not it 
was the finding upon which the hearing examiner was pursuaded 
there was a preponderance of evidence to believe the Appellant was 
under the influence. The actions of the officer were arbitrary and 
capricious then and in fairness the order should be vacated. 
The appropriate remedy for this error would be to reinstate 
the Appellant's driving privileges. Unfortunately, Appellant1s 
statutory suspension period of 90 days ran before the appeal was 
filed and his privilege cannot be retroactively restored. Nonethe-
less, the issue is not moot because the revocation remains recorded 
on his driving record and will detrimentally affect the Appellant's 
automobile insurance rates. Record of that revocation remains on 
Appellant's record for five years under State law, invoking 
the enhancement provisions under Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6(5) 
(1953, as amended). If Defendant were charged with a second DUI 
violation, and the administrative process resulted in a second per 
se suspension, the second per se suspension would be for an additional 
30 day period because of the prior suspension. Utah Code Annotated 
§41-2-19.6(5) (1953, as amended). Because of these collateral and 
enhancement consequences, Appellant should have the right to have 
the suspension stricken from his driving record and this Court 
should issue an order directing the Department of Public Safety to 
do the same. 
POINT III: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT THE HEARING ON THIS MATTER TO DETERMINE THE OFFICER 
HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE APPELLANT WAS DRIVING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
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For the State to have authority to suspend a person's driving 
privilege, it must be proven at hearing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe the DUI suspect was driving or in actual control of a 
vehicle while under the influence (See Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 
(1953, as amended), and Ballard vs. State Motor Vehicle Division, 
595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979). Appellant submits that the information 
the arresting officer relied upon was not sufficient to establish 
the officer had the reasonable grounds required. 
In Ballard, supra, the Utah Supreme Court defined this eviden-
tary standard as follows: 
"Reasonable grounds" exist where the facts and circumstances 
within the officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably 
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a situation 
exists." Jjd. at 1306. 
By virtue of the arguments stated in Points I and II, the test 
results relied on by the officer cannot be deemed to be trustworthy, 
or admissible for the purpose of determining whether the officer 
had reasonable grounds. Disregarding this evidence, the record is 
conspiciously void of any substantiated, objective evidence which 
would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Appellant was impaired to a 
degree which would render him incapable of safely operating a motor 
vehicle. 
A review of the record verifies the following was testified to 
by the arresting officer as evidence of Appellant's violation: 
(a) that the vehicle was traveling 66 mph in a 55 mile an hour 
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zone and Appellant did not pull right over after the officer's 
vehicle's lights were activated (T.13), that after he stopped 
the vehicle he smelled an odor of alcohol on Appellant's person 
and in the vehicle and observed beer cans in the vehicle (T.14-15), 
that Appellant admitted to having a "couple of beers" (T.15), 
that Appellant's eyes were bloodshot (T.95). 
However, Appellant's counsel at the hearing elicited this 
further information from the arresting officer. He believed the 
Appellant was under the influence based only on the odor of alcohol 
and presence of beer cans in the vehicle (T.97-98). He further 
acknowledged that there were other passengers in the vehicle (T.94) 
and he had no knowledge as to whether Appellant had consumed the 
contents of any of the cans (T.98). He was willing to arrest 
Appellant based solely on the odor of alcohol if the field sobriety 
tests were not performed (T.98). The officer further acknowledged 
that there was no erratic driving pattern (T.31-32) , ana the vehicle 
appeared to be driven "reasonably and prudently" (T.90-91) and that 
it was possible the back window and mirrors on the vehicle could 
have been obscured with mud (T.91-92). He conceded that Appel-
lant's bloodshot eyes could have been attributable to something 
other than alcohol consumption (T.95). In regard to the other 
physical characteristics of Appellant, the officer testified 
Appellant didn't seem to have any problems with his balance or 
speech (T.95). Considering all the competent testimony on the 
record, the hearing officer's determination that the state met its 
burden by a preponderance should be aeemed 
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arbritrary and capricious. 
An individual should not be deprived of his/her right to drive 
based only on a speeding infraction and the presence of alcohol on 
his/her person, with no further reliable evidence of impairment. 
The law does not and cannot proscribe and the mere consumption of 
alcohol and driving of a vehicle thereafter. There must be some 
competent evidence of impairment to meet the statutory mandates. 
In a typical DUI case, the allegation is usually supported by the 
fact that someone is incapable of driving safely. The evidence 
which indicates an impairment of the person's motor facilities such 
as lack of coordination and balance. With no competent evidence on 
the record verifying that impairment existed in this case, the 
State errored in determining by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the Appellant 
was driving under the influence. Consequently, the decisiion should 
be overturned and the suspension stricken from Appellant's record. 
POINT IV: APPELLANT'S STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE SUSPENSION OF APPELLANT'S 
DRIVING PRIVILEGE PRIOR TO A DECISION BY THE 
HEARING EXAMINER AND NOTICE TO APPELLANT. 
The statutory procedure initiated to suspend Appellant's 
driving privileges is defined in Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6(3), 
(5) (1953, as amended) as follows: 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the 
results indicate a blood alcohol content of .08% or more. 
or if the officer makes a determination, based on reason-
able grounds to believe that the determination is correct, 
that the person is otherwise in violation of section 
41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the test 
or making the determination shall serve on the person, on 
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behalf of the department, immediate notice of the depart-
ment's intention to suspend the person's privilege or 
license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate 
notice on behalf of the department he shall take the Utah 
driver license or certificate or permit, if any, of the 
driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 
days, and supply to the driver, on a form to be approved 
by the department, basic information regarding how to 
obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation 
issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the 
department, serve also as the temporary license. 
Upon written request of a person who has been issued a 30-
day license, the department shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 30 days after the date of 
arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request 
must be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and 
issuance of the 30-day license. A hearing, if held, shall 
be before the department in the county in which the 
arrest occurred, unless the department and the person agree 
that the hearing may be held in some other county. The 
hearing shall be documented and its scope shall cover the 
issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe the person to have been operating a motor 
vehicle in violation of section 41-6-44, whether the 
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results, 
if any. In connection with a hearing the department or 
its duly authorized agent may administer oaths and may 
issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers. One or more 
members of the department may conduct the hearing, and 
any decision made after a hearing before any number of 
the members of the department shall be as valid as if 
made after a hearing before the full membership of the 
department. After the hearing, the department shall 
order, either that the person's license or privilege to 
drive be suspended or that it not be suspended. A first 
suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this 
subsection, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning 
on the 31st day after the date of the arrest. A second 
or subsequent suspension under this subsection shall be 
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after 
the date of arrest. The department shall assess against 
a person, in addition to any fee imposed under subsection 
41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the 
person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover admin-
istrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the 
person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court 
decision that the suspension was not proper. A person 
whose license has been suspended by the department under 
this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after 
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the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if 
held, shall be governed by the provisions of section 
41-2-20. Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19,6(3) (5) (1953, 
as amended) (emphasis added). 
In this case, on the date of his arrest ana after a submission 
to a chemical test the Appellant's physical drivers license was 
taken by the arresting officer and he was issued a temporary license 
in citation form effective for only 30 days in accordance with the 
above-stated section (T.149). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6(5) Appellant timely 
requested a hearing (T.153-154). The hearing was held January 28, 
1986, within the 30 days authorized (T.147). No decision was 
rendered by the hearing examiner and no notice was sent to the 
Appellant or his counsel by February 4, 1986, the effective date 
of the suspension (T.137). The notice eventually sent, on its face, 
verifies that the suspension of Appellant's driving privileges was 
effective on the 31st day after the arrest, February 4, 1986, as 
provided by statute (T.137). It additionally showed that Appellant 
aid not get sent a notice until February 19, that Appellant's 
counsel did not get sent notice until February 29 (T.137). Appel-
lant's 30 day temporary license expired by Office of Drivers License 
Service records on February 4. Appellant was effectively without 
his driving privileges or a valid license on his person then prior 
to notice that they were legally suspended. By the above-stated 
actions, the Office of Driver License Services, Appellant was 
denied his driving provileges without being accorded his full 
statutory and constitutional rights to due process. 
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Statutorily Appellant has a right to hearing before revocation 
of his license under Utah Code Annotated §41-2-19.6 (1953, as amen-
ded). Implicit in that statutory scheme is the right to have a 
decision rendered on that hearing prior to a revocation of his 
driving privilege. Upon receiving the statutory request for hearing, 
the office is required to make a determination based on evidence at 
the hearing that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
arrested was within the statutory prohibition of Utah Code Annotated 
§41-2-19.6(5) (1953, as amended). In this case the failure of the 
Department to make a decision on the evidence presented at that 
hearing prior to the revocation of Appellant's driving privileges 
was tantamount to denying Appellant a hearing prior to the revoca-
tion. If an order and notice is not given on the date prior to the 
suspension, the suspension violates the Department regulations ana 
the statutory rights of Appellant. The Department's regulations 
require that notice be given of the suspension order pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §41-1-16 (1953, as amended) (T-12). It 
provides: 
Giving of notice — Method. Whenever the department 
is authorized or required to give any notice under this act or 
other law regulating the operation of vehicles, unless a 
different method of giving such notice is otherwise expressly 
prescribed, such notice shall be given either by personal 
delivery thereof to the person to be so notified or by deposit 
in the United States mail of such notice in an envelope with 
postage prepaid, addressed to such person at his address as 
shown by the records of the department. The giving of notice 
by mail is complete upon the expiration of four days after 
such deposit of said notice. Proof of the giving of notice in 
either such manner may be made by the certificate of any 
officer or employee of the department or affidavit of any 
person over eighteen years of age, naming the person to whom 
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such notice was given and specifying the time, place and manner 
of the giving thereof. 
In this case then, notice to Appellant would have been effective 
February 23, at the earliest, 4 days after the date it was pur-
portedly mailed to Appellant, 
Both the United States and Utah Supreme Court have recognized 
that a driver's license is a valuable, protected interest, which 
cannot be taken away by the State without federally mandated due 
process of law. In Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. 535 (1971) the United 
States Supreme Court outlined that right as follows: 
Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their 
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a 
livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state 
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. 
In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without 
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Sniadach v Family Finance Corp. 395 US 337, 23 L Ed 2d 
349, 89 S Ct 1820 (1969); Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 25 L 
Ed 2d 287, 90 S Ct 1011 (1970). This is but an application of 
the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints 
limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the 
entitlement is denominated a "right" or a "privilege." Ici. at 
Following that mandate under the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme 
Court, in Ballard vs. State, Motor Vehicle Division 595 P.2d 1302 
(Utah 1979) stated "the right to drive is a valuable right or 
privilege and it cannot be taken away without procedural due process" 
Ballard vs. State Motor Vehicle Division supra, at 595 P.2d 1304 
(citing Bell, supra). 
The Court in Ballard, supra, citing Bell , further noted that 
" . . . the State cannot arbitrarily revoke such a valuable priv-
ilege . . . . " §95 P.2d. By issuing a suspension order prior to a 
determination and notice to the Arrestee, the suspension was arbi-
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trary and capricious in this case. 
Due process rights under the Utah Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 7) 
have been interpreted to require hearing and notice before suspension. 
In Celebrity Club vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission 657 P.2d 1296 
(Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court outlined the due process require-
ments in administrative proceedings under the Utah Constitution 
as follows: 
The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
This Court has explained the due process guarantee as follows: 
[N]either a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a 
person a constitutional right or deprive such person of a 
vested interest in property without any opportunity to be 
heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without due 
process of law. 
Many attempts have been made to further define ,fdue 
process" but they all resolve into the thought that a party 
shall have his day in court — that is each party shall have 
the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the 
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish 
his cause or his defense, after which comes judgment upon the 
record thus made. 
Thus, the essential requirement of due process is that every 
citizen be afforded his "day in court." It has always been 
the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting 
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a contro-
versy. JUi. at 1296 (footnotes omitted). 
In the Celebrity Club case, supra, the Supreme Court reviewed a 
statute authorizing revocation of a liquor license prior to notice 
and hearing to the licensee. The Court determined the license 
involved was "property" within the meaning of the Utah Constitution 
and ruled that interest cannot be taken away without notice and 
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hearing. That a drivers license involves a like property interest 
has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell, supra, ana 
by this Court in Ballad, supra. 
Other states recognize that a suspension of a privilege or 
right cannot legally occur until the required notice is given. 
See e.g. People vs. Yount, 484 P.2d 1203 (Colo. 1971), Baker vs. 
State Ex Rel Larson, 533 P.2d 983 (Okl. 1983), Hall vs. Oregon 
Dept of Motor Vehicles, 457 P.2d 1975 (Or. App 1970). 
By effectuating a suspension the 31st day after Appellant1s 
arrest, before rendering a decision, or notifying Appellant of that 
decision, the Office of Drivers License Services violated the 
statutory scheme they are authorized to act under and the Appellant's 
due process rights, under the State Constitution. The District 
Court should have ruled accordingly after argument on the appeal of 
this matter. As stated hereinabove the only appropriate and equit-
able remedy in this case is to strike the revocation from Appellant's 
driving record. 
CONCLUSION 
The suspension of the Appellant's driving privileges was 
arbitrary and capricious for the reasons stated in the foregoing 
arguments. This Court should therefore issue an order directing 
the Office of Drivers License Services to remove the suspension 
from the Appellant's driving record. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of October, 1986. 
KRISTINE KAY SMITH 
CONDER & WANGSSARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this ^ 2 - ^ a y of October, 1986, I 
hand delivered four copies of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Attorney General, State Capitol, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. 
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41-2-19.6 MOTOR VEHICLES 
63-43-10. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last 1953; repeals and reenacts Section 41-6-43, 
amended by Chapter 2, Laws of Utah 1980, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Section 73-18-12. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Chapter 242, Laws of Utah 1979; and repeals 
as last amended by Chapter 183. Laws of Section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Utah 1977. and Section 76-5-207. Utah Code as last amended by Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 
Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 1982, Second Special Session. — Laws 1983, 
63, Laws of Utah 1981; enacts Sections ch. 99. 
41-2-19.5 and 41-2-19.6, Utah Code Annotated 
41-2-19.6. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for officer's request — 
Taking license — Report to department — Procedure by department — Sus-
pension. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
may be violating or has violated section 41-6-44 the peace officer may, in connection 
with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to a chemical test to 
be administered in compliance with the standards set forth in section 41-6-44.10. 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to 
a chemical test that results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the 
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation 
of the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination, based 
on reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct, that the person 
is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of 
the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the 
department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's 
privilege or license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf 
of the department he shall take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit, 
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days, and supply 
to the driver, o-', a form to be approved by the department, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation issued 
by the officer may, if approved as to form by the department, serve also as the 
temporary license. 
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the department within five 
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the person's license along 
with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a sworn report indicat-
ing the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis for the officer's determina-
tion that the person has violated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief regarding 
the person's violation of section 41-6-44. Each such report shall be on a form 
approved by the department and shall be endorsed by the police chief or his equiva-
lent or by a person authorized by him, other than the officer serving the notice. 
(5) Upon written request of a person who has been issued a 30-day license, the 
department shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 30 days 
after the date of arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request must 
be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance of the 30-day license. 
A hearing, if held, shall be before the department in the county in which the arrest 
occurred, unless the department and the person agree that the hearing may be held 
in some other county. The hearing shall be documented and its scope shall cover 
the issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person 
to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 41-6-44, whether the 
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results, if any In connection 
with a hearing the department or its duly authorized agent may administer oaths 
and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of 
relevant books and papers. One or more members of the department may conduct 
the hearing, and any decision made after a hearing before any number of the mem-
bers of the department shall be as valid as if made after a hearing before the full 
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OPERATORS' LICENSE ACT 41-2-21 
membership of the department. After the hearing, the department shall order, 
either that the person's license or privilege to drive be suspended or that it not 
be suspended. A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this sub-
section, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date 
of the arrest. A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection shall be 
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest. The 
department shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving 
privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be can-
celled if the person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court decision 
that the suspension was not proper. A person whose license has been suspended 
by the department under this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after 
the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be governed by 
the provisions of section 41-2-20. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L. 
1983. eh. 99. §6. 
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, revocation or suspension 
— Scope of review. Any person denied a license or whose license has been can-
celed, suspended or revoked by the department except where such cancellation or 
revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless the suspension 
occurred pursuant to section 41-2-19.6 shall have the right to file a petition within 
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in a court of record in the county 
wherein such person shall reside and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction 
and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon ten days' written notice 
to the department. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of the record to 
determine whether or not the department's decision was arbitrary or capricious. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 20; 2935, ch. 47, 
§ 2: C 1943, 57-4-23: L. 1983, ch. 99. § 7. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1983 amendment inserted "unless the 
suspension occurred pursuant to section 
41-249.6" in the first sentence: deleted "and 
thereupon to take testimony and examine 
into the facts of the case and to determine 
whether the petitioner is entitled to a license 
or is subject to cancellation, suspension or 
revocation of license under the provisions of 
this act" at the end of the first sentence: and 
added the second sentence. 
41-2-21. New license after revocation. (1) Any person whose license has been 
revoked under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or receive any new license 
until the expiration of one year from the date such former license was revoked 
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-2-19. Licenses which have been 
revoked may not be renewed, but application for a new license must be filed as 
provided in section 41-2-8. and a license so issued shall be subject to all of the 
provisions of an original license. The department shall not grant the license until 
an investigation of the character, abilities and habits of the driver has been made 
to indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him the privilege of using the 
highways. 
(21 Any resident or nonresident whose operator's license to operate a motor 
vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked as provided in this act shall 
not operate a motor vehicle in this state under a license, permit, or registration 
certificate issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise during such suspension or 
after such revocation until a new license is obtained when and as permitted under 
this act. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, §21: 1935, ch. 47. 
§ 2: 1941, ch. 51. § 2: C. 1943, 57-4-24: L. 1967, 
ch. S2. §12: 1983. ch. 183, §23. 
Compiler's Notes, 
The 1983 amendment deleted "or chauf-
feur's" after "operator's'* in subsec. (2). 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-44 
ossible to locate the owner of 
lead animal. 
esulting in a broken fence, if 
nent of livestock, shall make 
e owner of the property and 
against any peace officer for 
ty. Nothing in this subsection 
nst a peace officer for failure 
or broken fence to contact the 
:al brand inspector. - Laws 1985, 
-6-38.5. 
'KLESS DRIVING 
: with high blood alcohol content 
'arrant — Suspension or revoca-
lce. 
for driving under the influence 
height, 
driving while license suspended 
or drug - Refusal to allow -
t action on revocation - Person 
le — Who may give test — Evi-
I peace officers. 
ith code. (1) An ordinance 
i driving or being in actual 
1 in the blood or while under 
influence oi alcohol and any 
tters, the use of a' chemical 
>r penalties or that governs 
with the provisions in this 
governs reckless driving, or 
e safety of persons or prop-
ie which govern those mat-
otes. 
ch. 99, § 11 repealed old section 
>79, ch. 242, §12), relating to 
il authorities, and enacted new 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1957, 
ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12), relating to neg-
ligent homicide, was repealed by Laws 1985 
(IstS.S.), ch. 1, §2. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or with high blood 
alcohol content — Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Suspen-
sion or revocation of license. (1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by 
weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influ-
ence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within 
this state. The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not constitute a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of alco-
hol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(3) [a] Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsection 
(1) [oi this section] shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 60 days 
nor more than six months, or by a fine of $299, or by both [streh] the fine and 
imprisonment^ except that]. But if the person has inflicted a bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, 
he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one 
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000. 
(b) For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple 
negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily reason-
able and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(4) In addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), the court shall, 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consec-
utive hours nor more than ten days2 with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank 
of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-service work program 
for not less than two nor more than ten days and, in addition to the jail sentence 
or the work in the community-service work program, order the person to partici-
pate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction under 
this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance 
with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided 
for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours nor more than ten daysz with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank 
of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-service work program 
for not less than ten nor more than 30 days and, in addition to the jail sentence 
or the work in the community-service work program, order the person to partici-
pate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility [•&&£ &e\ The court may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain treat-
ment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second conviction 
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in com-
pliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties pro-
vided for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 30 
nor more than 90 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail 
or require the person to work in a community-service work project for not less 
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41-6-44 2 MOTOR \ EHICLES 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 
Repeal. blood alcohol content of lO r^ or higher, was 
Section 41-b-44 2 <L 1973 ch 80, §2 19*2 repealed bv Laws 1983 ch 99 §21 
(2nd S S ) ch 4, § 2) relating to driving with 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence. (1) The com-
missioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and 
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath including standards of 
training 
(2) In an\ action or proceeding in which it is material to pro\e that a person 
was driving or in actual ph\sical control of a vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents 
offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to prove that the 
anahsis was made and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards 
established in subsection (1) shall be admissible if 
(a) The judge finds that the\ were made in the regular course of the investiga-
tion at or about the time of the act, condition or event, and 
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and circum-
stances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection (1) and 
the conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the 
test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is 
unnecessary 
History C 1953 41 6-44 3 enacted bv L 
1979 ch 243 § 2 L 1983, ch 99 § 14 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1983 amendment substituted "alcohol 
content statutonh prohibited for alcohol 
content of 10^ or greater in subsec (2) 
substituted anahsis was made and the 
instrument used was accurate according to 
standards' for 'anahsis and accuracv of the 
instrument were made pursuant to stan-
dards in subsec (2) substituted 'condi 
tions for provisions in subsec (3), and 
made a minor change in phraseologv 
Constitutionality. 
Given the legitimate governmental interest 
in not having to produce in e\erv DLI case 
the public officer responsible for testing the 
accuracv of the breathalyzer and the 
ampoules, and the alternative means availa-
ble to an accused to cross-examine and con-
front such a witness this section does not 
violate the constitutional right of confronta 
tion when all of its requirements are met 
Murrav Citv v Hall (1983) 663 P 2d 1314 
Ampoules used in test. 
Since the ampoules used in the testing are 
such an integral part of the breathalyzer 
equipment, this section applies to such 
ampoules Murrav Cm v Hall (19*3) 663 P 
2d 1314 
Findings required. 
Prior to the acceptance of affidavits to 
establish a presumption of validity of the 
test results this section requires an affirma-
tive finding bv the trial court that the cali-
bration and testing for accuracv of the 
breathahzer and the ampoules were per-
formed in accordance with the standards 
established bv the commissioner of public 
safetv the affidavits were prepared in the 
regular course of the public officer s duties 
that thev were prepared contemporaneously 
with the act condition or event, and the 
source of information from which made and 
the method and circumstances of their prep-
aration were such as to indicate their trust-
worthiness affidavits were inadmissible 
where the record was de\oid of such findings 
and where the affidavits showed on their 
face that rhe affiants did not attest from 
their own personal knowledge Murray Citv 
v Hall 11983) 663 P 2d 1314 
Hearsay exception 
So long as there is compliance with the 
mandates of this section namel\, contempo-
raneous preparation in accordance with 
established standards in the regular course 
of the officer s duties and indications of 
trustworthiness the affidavits regarding the 
maintenance of a breathahzer machine are 
admissible under this section as a valid stat-
utory exception to the hearsav rule Murrav, 
Citv v Hall (1983) 663 P 2d 1314 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
BRUCE M. HALE 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General 
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
T e l e p h o n e : 533-76 06 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RIC E. WANGSGARD, ] 
P e t i t i o n e r , ) 
v s . ; 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief , ] 
D r i v e r L i c e n s e S e r v i c e s , ! 
S t a t e of U tah , ] 
Responden t . ] 
I FINDINGS OF FACT, 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 AND ORDER 
1 Case No. C86-1376 
1 Judge Raymond S. Uno 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r hav ing come b e f o r e t h e Cour t 
p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-20 on March 1 1 , 1986 and t h e 
c a s e h a v i n g been taken under adv i semen t and t h e Court b e i n g f u l l y 
a d v i s e d i n t h e p r e n i s e s f now makes t h e f o l l o w i n g F i n d i n g s and 
C o n c l u s i o n s . 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . The Court f i n d s t h a t t h e r e i s competent ev idence of 
s u b s t a n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t shows t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r r e c e i v e d 
an o p p o r t u n i t y for a h e a r i n g , was no t p r e j u d i c e d , and t h e h e a r i n g 
examiner was no t a r b i t r a r y or c a p r i c i o u s . 
o FILED «N CLERK S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
APR 2 3 1986 
XyDepul/ Cier* 
2. There was s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o f i n d t h a t t h e 
i o f f i c e r had r e a s o n a b l e g rounds t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e 
: i o n e r had been o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e in v i o l a t i o n of t h e 
Having made t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of F a c t , t h e Cour t 
makes i t s : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court c o n c l u d e s t h a t , t h e r e be ing no p r e j u d i c e 
L r b i t r a r i n e s s or c a p r i c i o u s n e s s , t h e p e t i t i o n shou ld be 
. l i ssed . 
O R D E R 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED t h a t t h e 
i t i o n i s d i s m i s s e d . 
DATED t h i s -~ ~ day of /'ir^si— 1986 . 
r J - / / 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H.DIXON HINOLEV 
' X 1 C \ A Cie{K 
- 2 -
SCOTT /* . MATH6SON 
Governor 
H h 5 I A I C <jr u m i 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
317 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 533-4900 LARRY £. LUNNEN 
Commissioner 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
I hereby certify that the attached Breath Testing Regulations 
are a true arid correct copy of the regulations established by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety. 
U^L 
y<RRY g/LJJNNEN C 
Commissioner of Public Safety 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF d>L-
ss. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
of ^/iJi . 19 f y . 
K. day 
BREATH TESTING REGULATIONS 
Revised: April 1, 1981 
Archives file! 4714 
Revised: November 4,,1983 
Archives file* 6734 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
sionzA. 
! . TECHNIQUES OR METHODS 
A. Tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in a persons blood, 
may be applied to blood, breath or other bodily substances. Results 
shall be expressed as equivalent to grams of alcohol per one hundred 
(100) cubic centimeters of blood. The results of such tests shall be 
entered in a permanent record book. 
B. Written check lists, outlining the method of properly performing 
the tests in use under division A of this regulation, shall be 
available at each location where tests are given. The check list and 
the test record shall be retained by the operator administering the 
test or the arresting officer. 
Definition: 
A check list sets forth the steps, in sequence, that a breath 
test operator must follow. A square is provided by each of the 
steps for the operator to check each one as it is performed to 
insure proper operation of the test instrument. 
I I . BREATH TESTS 
A. Breath samples of alveolar air shall be analyzed with instruments 
specifically designed for the analysis of breath. The calculation 
of the blood alcohol concentration shall be on the basis of aveolar 
air to blood ratio of 2100:1. Breath samples shall be analyzed 
according to the methods described by the manufacturer of the 
instrument or instructions issued by the office of the Commissioner 
of Public Safety. 
TESTS FOR CHECKING CALIBRATION 
A, Breath testing instruments must be certified on a routine basis 
not to exceed forty (40) days. 
B, Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropri-
ate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for 
checking calibration recommended by the manufacturer of the 
instrument or the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
C, Results of test for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record 
book. A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the 
appropriate form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing 
Program. The supervisor of the Breath Testing Program is hereby 
designated as the official keeper of said records. 
PROCEDURE FOR CERTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS 
A. Breathalyzer 
1. Instrument heating properly: 
a. between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade 
2. Collection chamber output: 
a. COLD between 55 and 58 ccfs 
b. WARM between 50 and 54 ccMs 
3. NULL meter functioning properly: 
a* Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both 
directions. 
• 
• 
Read light in mechanical center: 
Place two ampoules of the same control number in the holders, 
turn on the read light, balance galvanometer and check for 
mechanical center. Switch the ampoules, turn on the read 
light. The null meter should not swing more than I inch in 
either direction. 
Blood alcohol pointer slippage check: 
Balance the instrument with ampoules in the holders. Set 
the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or center of the Blood 
Alcohol scale. Using the light carriage adjustment, and with 
the read light on, run the B. A. needle to .00% and back to 
.20%, observing to see that the null meter balances at the 
same time the B. A. needle reaches .20%. Then run the B.A 
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see that the nul 
meter balances at the .20% line on the blood alcohol scale. 
Simulator Check: 
At least three (3) simulator checks of a known value shall b* 
run on the instrument. The results must be within .01% plus 
or minus of the actual value of the known solution. 
Ampoule Check: 
A series of simulator tests with the .accumulated total of .60* 
shall be run on an ampoule from each control number on ha~d 
with the instrument. The results of each simulator test must 
be within .01% plus or minus of the actual value. The ampoJe 
should then be observed to see if there is a slight yellow caor, 
indicating the presence of potasium dichromate. If it meets the 
above standards, the chemicals are correct or within allowed 
tolerances • 
4. Read light in mechanical center: 
Place two ampoules of the same control number In the holders, 
turn on the read light, balance galvanometer and check for 
mechanical center. Switch the ampoules, turn on the read 
light. The null meter should not swing more than i inch in 
either direction. 
5. Blood alcohol pointer slippage check: 
Balance the instrument with ampoules in the holders. Set 
the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or center of the Blood 
Alcohol scale. Using the light carriage adjustment, and with 
the read light on, run the B. A. needle to .00% and back to 
.20%, observing to see that the null meter balances at the 
tame time the B. A. needle reaches .20%. Then run the B.A. 
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see thai the null 
meter balances at the .20% line on the blood alcohol scale. 
6. Simulator Check: 
At least three (3) simulator checks of a known value shall be 
run on the instrument. The results must be within .01% plus 
or minus of the actual value of the known solution. 
7. Ampoule Check: 
A series of simulator tests with the .accumulated total of .60% 
shall be run on an ampoule from each control number on hand 
with the instrument. The results of each simulator test must 
be within .01% plus or minus of the actual value. The ampoule 
should then be observed to see if there is a slight yellow color, 
indicating the presence of potasium dichromate. If it meets the 
above standards, the chemicals are correct or within allowed 
tolerances. 
B. Intoxilyzer 
1. Place the mode selector switch in the zero set mode. 
2. ELECTRICAL POWER CHECK: With the power switch on, 
observe to see that the power indicator light comes on, 
indicating there is electrical power to the instrument. 
3. TEMPERATURE CHECK: If the instrument is already 
warmed up, check to see that the ready light is on. 
If it is not warmed up, wait approximately 10 minutes 
to see that the ready light comes on. (This tight 
indicates that the sample chamber Is heated to the 
proper temperature). 
4. INTERNAL PURGE CHECK: Put the mode selector in 
the air blank mode. Place thumb on the end of the pump 
tube to see that it is pumping air. Time the pumping 
sequence to see that it pumps for approximately 35 
seconds. 
5. ZERO SET AND ERROR INDICATOR CHECK: (AS Model) 
Set the mode selector in the zero set mode. Depress the 
zero adjust knob and adjust the digital display to a plus 
• 000, .001, .002 or .003 to see that you can achieve a proper 
zero set. Re-set the digital display above the acceptable plus 
.000 to .003. Place the mode selector to the test mode and 
observe to see that the error light comes on. Repeat, placing 
the digital display at minus .000 and observe to see that the 
error light comes on when the mode selector is placed in the 
test mode. 
c 
(ASA Model) 
Advance the test cycle to the zero set mode and see that 
the unit registers a reading of plus .000, .001, .002, or 
• 003. I f this reading is not observed, advance to the next 
cycle and see that the error light comes on. 
6. FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR CHECK: With the test 
card in the printer, run a test on the fixed absorbtion 
calibrator to see that the instrument gives the correct 
reading on the digital display and the printed test card. 
THIS CHECK NOT REQUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS NOT 
EQUIPPED WITH THE FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR. 
7. SIMULATOR CHECK: Run three tests on a simulator 
solution of a known value and an air blank before each 
one. Observe to see that the correct readings, within 
plus or minus .01% of the actual value is indicated on the 
digital display and printed on the test card for each simula-
tor test and a .00% reading for each air blank. 
8. -PRINTER DEACTIVATOR CHECK: (AS Model) Run a 
simulator test with the zero set NOT in the proper zero 
set range, to see that the printer is deactivated and will 
not print. 
(ASA Model) 
This check must be performed before the unit is up to 
operating temperature. (before the ready lamp is on) 
Advance the unit to the first purge cycle (air blank). 
Observe the error light to see that it is lit. At the end 
of the test cycle (approximately 35 seconds), see that the 
pump *tops and that the printer is deactivated and will 
not print• 
QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL 
A. Breath test shall be performed by a qualified operator who shall 
have completed the operators course prescribed by the Commissioner 
of Public Safety. Operators shall use only those instruments 
which they are certified to operate. 
B. Breath test operator certification requirements: 
1 . Must have successfully completed training for each type of 
instrument and pass the required test, as approved by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety. 
2. Operators must complete an approved recertification training 
course and pass a test every two (2) years to maintain their 
certification. 
C. Breath test technician requirements: 
1. Must comply with one of the following: 
a. Must successfully complete the Breath Testing Supervisors 
course offered by Indiana State University. 
b. A manufacturers repair technician course for the breath 
testing instruments in use in the State of Utah* 
c. Be qualified by the nature of his employment or training 
to maintain and repair the breath testing instrument in 
question and to instruct In the proper operation of the 
Instrument. 
REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION 
A# The Commissioner of Public Safety may on the recommendation of 
a technician, revoke the certification of any operator: 
1. Who obtains a certification card falsely or deceitfully. 
2. Who fails to comply with the foregoing provisions governing 
the operation of breath test instruments. 
3. Who fails to demonstrate satisfactory performance in 
operating breath testing instruments. 
PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL 
The foregoing regulations shall not be construed as invalidating the 
qualification of personnel previously qualified as either breath test 
operators or breath test technicians under programs existing prior 
to the promulgation of these regulations. Such personnel shall be 
deemed certified until such time as retraining would have been re-
quired were these regulations not in effect. 
This provision shall take effect as if enacted contemporaneously with 
the other Breath Testing Regulations of the Department of Public 
Safety on June 11, 1979. 
In the opinion of the Department of Public Safety, it is necessary to 
the peace, health and welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Utah 
that this regulation become effective immediately. 
I N T O X I L Y Z E © BREATHALYZER OPERATOR T W I N I N G 
A. Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath 
Test Technician and should include the following: 
1 hour..•Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety. 
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body. 
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing. 
2 hours..Alcoholic Influence Report Form. 
2 hours. .Testimony of the Arresting Officer. 
3 hours. .Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing. 
1 hour...Detecting the Drinking Driver. 
8 hours*.Laboratory Participation. (Running Simulator tests on the 
instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects). 
1 hour...Examination and Critiques of Course. 
B. Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing 
Technician and should include the following: 
2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body. 
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing. 
1 hour...Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of arresting officer. 
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the 
Drinking Driver. 
1 hour.. .Exam. 
C. Anyone having previously successfully completed a twenty-four (24) 
hour operators school, may be recertified at anytime by successfully 
completing an eight (8) hour recertification course, and also may be 
certified to operate another type of breath testing instrument after 
eight (8) hours instruction pertaining to the instrument in question. 
f^lF TATE CF'/TAH 
JEPAt yiENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY DOB: 12-02-54 
NORMAN H. BANGERTER GOVERNOR JOHN T. NIELSEN. COMMISSIONER 
D. DOUGLAS BODRERO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
L. DALE ELTON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
•• MK 0 3 i9c5 
RIG E WANGSGARD 
2802 W 3500 SO 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT. 84119 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
FILE NUMBER 011677860 
!i 
r*M 
BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IV IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR 
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A 
PERIOD OF-3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 04 FEBRUARY 1986. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU 
IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE, IF 
ANY, AND ALL OTHER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU. 
THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 AND THAT 
A PEACE OFFICER HAD, REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD 
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. 
41-6-44 (DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW). 
UTAH LAW REQUIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIVING PRIVILEGE 
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $25.00 FEE FOLLOWING 
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE 
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $25.00 
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE 
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED FOR 
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED WITHIN 20 DAYS ALL 
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR 
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT 
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT. 
IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON THE 
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS 
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED. 
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE 
COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS. 
[j 
c c : S c o t t R. Vangsgard 
Attorney a t Law 
U059 S. ^000 V. 
W.V.D. UT fiUl20 
DI 203 
RESPECTFULLY YOURS, 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, BUREAU CHIEF 
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
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Date of 
Hearing 
OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
DRIVER IMPROVEMENT AND CONTROL 
Report of Proceedings of Hearing for Administrative Suspension 
(Section 41-2-19.6 UCA 1953 As Amended) 
Time Set 
V/ 
for Hearing 
-afr-fcl 9:^2)/R 
Name and Address of Attorney 
Witness & 
ufc 
e and Address of Driver 
-ZbC t^-UA 
Date of Birth 
Hearing Officer 
JL^UJ^CLrrr^ 
Arresting Officer 
^JfrX&ffettflhA £e^>+*<*> Y&SJ^ 
Agency 
Date of Arrest Witnesar 
/ - ^-vfe;I M^^^Jr^^r^ 
Witness Location of Hearing Witness 
UAA+* 
OPENING STATEMENT 
0 f^J 
This hearing is being conducted at the driver's request in accordance with Section 41-2-19.6 Utah 
Code Annotated, following his arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a 
combination of alcohol and drugs. 
Formal rules of evidence and procedure shall not strictly apply. However, as the Hearing Officer, I will 
take sworn testimony and consider all relevant evidence presented at this hearing. 
If your driving privilege is suspended, you shall have the right to petition a court of record in the county 
in which you reside within thirty days after the effective date of such suspension for judicial review by 
the court, as provided for in Section 41-2-20, Utah Code Annotated. 
Those testifying will be sworn, and the hearing shall proceed. 
Administrative notice is taken of the fact that the Office of Driver License Services is in receipt of the 
following documents and information which are official records on file with this Department: 
The officer's report submitted in compliance with UCA 41-2-19.6. 
A citation indicating the driver's arrest for a violation of UCA 41-6-44. 
Notice served by the officer of the Department's intent to suspend, and information on 
how to receive a hearing by the Department. 
Receipt of hearing request within ten days. 
Test machine record of test results. 
Operational checklist of test instrument. 
Utah Highway Patrol record of the chemical test machine maintenance test and 
affidavit pursuant to UCA 41-6-44.3. 
Other (ie. Documents and/or information received in behalf of the driver and/or other 
evidence received which is made official record for the purpose of this hearing). 
Explain: 
Yes 
K 
« 
4 
tf 
* 
D 
9L 
No 
• 
D 
D 
• 
*L 
PC 
D 
K. 
3 sworn testinrv 
Facts leading t> 
Officer: 
rw-„e offic 
^ 2 - »»p*<rf> ^nStsz/Xtud* 
o believe the driver had been driving o actua. . . ai control of.?. 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination of alcohol and any drug: 
ctor.-
p*&Ca&l 
%
~2*cd2&+y'2&~*~*&2^ 
3rarre5i: INO U ies i& 
Charge: T> ^ X 
;) The driver submitted to a chemical test as requested by a peace officer which showed a test result of 
JU, 
.%. 
d) The driver was advised prior to the chemical test that results could lead to suspension of his/her driving 
privilege: No O Yes pi 
e) Officer who administered chemical test was certified to do so: No • Yes S, 
(f) Proper procedure was performed or observed by reporting officer in the administration of the chemical .. 
test: No D Yes^  QE (explain procedure): to *~*4y4*fet>*di! £fS&*iU ^t****f^l&cc '6$tZ£4?f*tr*c& 
(g) Evidence and/or information received indicaffng the test machine wasjq was not D in proper working order at-54 a 
^ the time test was administered (explain): /^C^I^U<L£SZZU^^^<^/^^ ***" 
(h) DUI Report Form was properly notarized: No • Yes*! 
2. Testimony of witness officer or other witness for reporting officer: 
F. That there was ^  w Jevid. -e of a chemical test and/or other basis f- heoffic. .ermmationtha'*he 
driver was in violation of 41-6-44. jst results _^Z^L_% or other (ie. drugs, ,-xplain: ^ e S 2 7 i * « » / * « ^ -
G. Other (not covered above); explain: Y\ &UU£^_j • 
CONCLUSIONS: 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO SUSPEND THE DRIVING PRIVILEGE PURSUANT TO UCA 41-2-19.6 W E R ^ S ^ 
WERE NOT • IN PLACE IN THIS CASE, AND THE FOLLOWING DECISION IS RENDERED: 
\ > T o suspend the driving privilege • To take no action 
•""^•by authority of UCA 41-2-19.6 
Comments by hearing officer: ^ 9 ^ « _ J L . » 
Hearing Officer: y r f ^ ^ 
FOR CENTRAL OFFICE USE ON 
Approved by: W M / / O X ^ ^ V I Title: C\ /•/• P 
Comments: 
4 
3. Substance of testimony by driv ^ £ . ^ * y < ^ ^ ^ ^ ' *~=&zz^^ 
4. Substance of statements and/or questions by driver's legal counsel 
\ci.J&3u£. <0- -2*oo£ 
1
 ^&U». 
, £<^ Xx~a*/ i*s-s^ ^Cc^, * 
E r d ^ ^ - ^ ^ g ^ D ^ u-4&c£& s^  *~*«r-&di*^ IS-Z^OJJIJZ^
 f4^^r7^^^ J^L^. 
^ ^ - ~ -
\*JP ^su 
M &ZL*<***4 
HAVING HEARD AND RECEIVED EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THOSE PRESENT AT THIS HEARING. THE 
DEPARTMENT NOW MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT: 
A. That the peace officer had reason to believe that the driver wasTS^ was not • in violation of UCA 41-6-44. 
B. That the driver was^ S^ T was not D placed under arrest for a violation under UCA 41-6-44. 
C. That the chemical test was^Sf was not • administered by an officer certified to do so. 
D. That all operational procedures and requirements wer§j3^ were not • met to insure proper working order of the 
test machine. 
E. That all procedures and requirements were j i ^ were not • followed by the reporting officer pursuant to UCA 
41-2-19.6. (Explain what procedures were not fallowed, if any): 
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SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT. 
DATE 
W-ffc 
EARING TYPE SUBJECTS NAME SUBJECTS FILE NO. 
/2je~> i$Z> £ • Ututffifbu? //&7?£&o 
U-
IJJUU. _^^JL^0j& Jln^Cu^u t^i£*s~ ,^a*Lj ^£ki<siy-'- j9 ^^ S?<^ 
^ dJZa* s£o^» jb-Le&Z&c - /^U^ ^_#^&~*J?^k~£L*i*Jf6>*^~* -?%i^ 
£^L sjht&t' 
& . 
* 
<l&<d<c .6*>4±'*€> >J£ 
''t*<^6*vuvL<*<***&<<<z 
C**WK4Z €-£<!*. 
dfdsCjt i^L^t JZj5T^£ 
&6 
A C -
••+&-> 00-"&Zr-^-
:
r£r^ i - t 4 , £>-L&*&t 
~^7 
& ; 
S T^^jL* 
HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE 
SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT 
TE 
£-®C fM^ 
HEARING TYPE SUBJECTS NAME SUBJECTS FILE NO. 
J?2^ g - ^ J^y^X<S\ //£>??£&& 
" U J ^ w ^ Qrrfc/L- PJ"^ - - - ^ ^ ^ ^ ~Z&c/jU /U^^fa^^^ 
^L&& V 
T z a / ^ ^ ^ g ^ ^ v V 
e#<^ 
sCg~ s£+c**-
^g-^yct^ , 
/<£<> ****** r•sC^^rrr^^t 
^ < ^ --^fefiL. ^ ^ _ 
^U^u^Jf 
~7> 
"C^^. s* ", {&****&* <fr sfatrtj2*^*- - £ £ - * ^ 
di «'«*<# <$&< ^"yrfvaiJ? /ttrf<l& Z&&,*#t<' ^ ^ ? Z*4^ 
-tfb-
CCr) / ^ H E A R I N G OFFICEF 
'^*Lii-^^^*£ 
HEARING C R'S SIGNATURE 
SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT 
DATE HEARING TYPE SUBJECTS NAME SUBJECTS FILE NO. 
1-1$. JAM //<£7^o 
- V -
vj-*a- j p ^ s ^ e ^ /C^j£z£^J) ^<5pZU^3Z^ J&&3^ ^~*A*epCJuj^ 
<& it - K - ^ ^v^n^ergv » C/.^ f , f ^ f a 
_teZL^ ^ , ^ P ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ . . 7 ^ ^ . ^ S ^ * / JZZ^USZ. C^^SJJ^ 
& £ fuux^^r ^rsr P *lrrf 1 W - » ^ V ^ 
^2E55f-? 
_J*LL ^ t ^ e _ -n - i ^ ^ / - ^ r " i ? ^ a l t f ^ ^ ^ J / V U L ^ - ' / 6 C C ^ ^ U J 
~«^^Uso& ~&Zl*- u-aJjuUCbs. 
rr 
CJUZXZ* JU&dk 5^- ?6r 
P'^J) ^Tf U J /\-/Cvx-cc4 
-LS^C^SSL I . . r-gyrO. -dL c c 
-a^-^^s^ 
j*t£c*^ 
^ / A - g ^ f r ^ C V ? ^ ^ 
x ^ v u ^ > Z^a £><-*S* £*s-d'cZA ^sCi*g>^£ y^ 
<£V***y^i^ ****£+jpy^W&r^^ c£dtt:*arT<x<L> ^r 
s °^ - ^ 
ZZZZc** 
• J U A ^ sm^tx^ . / ^ /r^c^ej? _ 
r" 
r-
Tf a ** 
cv ^HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE-
'«£. 
SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT 
iTE HEARING TYPE SUBJECTS NAME SUBJECTS FILE NO. 
- g -%4£L , ^ 1 [&U £- UJa^y^^JP 1 \~~//£77<feo 
<Z& U fit?*': <ff* 
yuur~ 
"
l/9)^V—t^&lUS&aer-* 
\sL>&tseg Ctfa4.«&tf<*s<d? ^>y 
(?&rvh 
J^X**f?rry\ ida&tf* 
* & & * 
P ^ ^ ' W P l j>*^*+m-*mm §jiV'*mW*m™-\ 
*"<P- 4ffi-6L/& JL 
.stsCfT 
'^UA^^^n, "fax: / y ^ ^ j j ^ S^jfe^&l^ ZZc^-> ^U2z. 
t ^ - ^ g 
£L<ts-n, «-6- ~z£g£frxJft* 
b) J^L^CL HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE 
SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT 
DATE HEARING TYPE SUBJECTS NAME SUBJECTS FILE NO. 
/-z£- **-[/& 4*s- fec<> ' (^ a*M^*2^*2'*d' I \ / /£> ~? *?£& O 
&«t**kXi?.d 
0U4~~fc> TT 
&?Jrt, \»Hnst Cstus 
JL'-' 
4&-
7 
- r / 4><^* \f-eJQ, t e*£n^ i_-_~«->- '->• ^"A <-
JL ^x L ^ t f f 
/Lo<-£*^~ 
!4Q. 
J^T* 
r4t,*<*C*<i.& 
*4jQ. 
•£&4&4ii 
^d$^ 
... 7: 
,/L jLj&&r4rfZsl£ld*<sL'tt. t hr 
\j , rUQ g 
— "5-
(V 2r-LJ&<L*n~ HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATIilRT 
SUPPLEMENT TO HEARING REPORT. 
JE 
WWTZ 
HEARING TYPE SUBJECTS NAME SUBJECTS FILE NO. 
/?Jc ,f-a /,-<«y^J \2&77S&o 
/ -
\ 
,*S**** (tit .AAt d< fiH tCtra enm 
uszz*<*-> AsUn 
f=^r V •£. 
•U- irz ^ei^ ^fe 
[rw rt jtfi^tJh l&%Ctt/~. sttiA-f^ &r?<1ljtf£?L .Jgk&i CSS<<«f ^u. 
A J 
c*f 
\jr\A*A*+ •^/-D jf?4«Z*CUi £t<U*4i-*t «£fo*L 1 ' " ' V,mm / l — W ^ J * W Lr*V^ urn^T <%?** ^ £. 
-*-—•* ^ > - Y V -4L" ***d? 
+~*\ ^yCuj^ P A err*- Z&d- J&&. 
% 
7 ^JjCtU* L*-Jj££* HEARING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE 
W * 4~»*« 14.1 VJ W • ' < • A A n A A t W M J »<L« W W A \ i-S V_/A l i W U A i U l t i - H i L J 1 S \ JY U A T T i U A V J i ( A j " / 
G the undersigned, ..ig fir duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial number ^/V^ 00\/0£>3 
located at / ? / / / ' m&(+ of official duties, on U&ec£rribs''t 13 "^ T at was properly checked by me/us in the course /M<? /{M. 
2. This was done according to the standards established by the Commissioner of 
the Utah Department of Public Safety. 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made at the 
time these tests were done. 
! FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
Electrical power check: (Power switch on, power indicator light is on) 
Temperature check (Ready light is on) 
Internal purge check: (Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds) 
Zero set , Error indicator, and Printer check: 
(Zero set at -000, .001, .002, .003) 
(With proper zero sat, printer works properly) 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on) 
Fixed absorbtion calibrator test (if equipped) 
(Reads within - .01* of calibration setting) 
Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests within - . 01 %) 
Gives readings in percent blood dlcohol by weight, based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 cubic centimeters of blood. 
YES 
URS REQUIRED A/<fn4-
(If yes, explain) 
simulator solution was of the correct kind and properly compounded. 
The results of this test show that the instrument is working prcperly. 
prior check of this instrument was done on *7 /' A'2 /c^-r? &£*C / ff^CT 
- * ' 
(7x> 
^L. 
=r 
Z£*i '/ 
_*4a. 
\J 
,j*+ sn 
"E OF'UTAH 
/ 
JTY OF 
NO 
f ) 
f ] 
f ] 
t ] 
r j 
f J 
[ ] 
1 ) 
i 1 
[ ) 
'BHZATH TEST TECHNICIAN (S) 
I/we, on oaj_h .vjjtate that't^e-ioregoing is true. 
v
 , t ' ' r1 
l \ V 
'J*4* iribed and sworn Before me this (/? £Lday of /{JJL^^L^^ JL , \*8sT 
City of Residence flCcJjJ hZ^L 
1 1 
amission 
County of Residence 
19 LU 
T *V MATHESON 
Governor 
IRY I. LUNNEN 
*orr»mi«s#on«f 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
HIGHWAY SAFETY DIVISION 
OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
(801)965-4411 
ROBERT F. PARENTI 
Director 
FRED C SCHWEN01MAN, Mgr. 
Driver Ucenj* Services 
DRIVER LICENSE ADMINISTRATION HEARING RULES AND REGULATIONS 
FOR ALCOHOL-RELATED OFFENSES 
PURPOSE AND INTENT 
It is the purpose and intent of these rules and regulations to 
implement the legislative intent set forth in Utah Code Annotated 
41-2-19.6 as amended, and more specifically, subparagraph five (5) 
of the cited statute. This is, to safely protect persons traveling 
on roads and highways in the State of Utah by quickly removing from 
those roads and highways persons who have shown that they are safety 
hazards by driving with a drug or alcohol content that renders the 
individual driver a hazard to the safety of the traveling public, or 
where there is evidence that would show that the individual was 
impaired to such a degree that his is incapable of driving safely on 
the highways of the State of Utah. 
PERSONS ENTITLED TO A HEARING 
Any person who is arrested under the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated 41-6-44 or any alcohol-related statutes that apply under 
Utah Code Annotated 41-2-19.6 who makes proper written application 
pursuant to the .laws of the State of Utah, is entitled to a hearing. 
PLAINTIFFS 
HOW TO REQUEST A HEARING 
A person who is entitled to a hearing must make a written request 
to the administrative offices of the Department of Public Safety, Office 
of Driver License Services, located in Salt Lake City, Utah, 4501 South 
2700 West, 84119. Such written request shall include the name of the 
individual, the current address, the date of birth and/or license number 
of the driver, and date and place of arrest, 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
The driver will be notified in writing at the last known address 
contained in the official records of the department (or the new address 
if one is provided by the driver in the request for a hearing) of the 
time and the place to appear for the requested hearing. 
PLACE AND TIME OF HEARING 
The hearing will be held in the county in which the arrest occurred, 
in the offices of the Office of Driver License Services, Department of 
Public Safety, or a place convenient to the department and the individual 
driver. In cases of disagreement, the decision of the department is 
final. The hearing will take place within 30 days of the date of arrest. 
APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSIONS 
Unless drugs are involved, an administrative suspension hearing will 
be given, only in cases where the officer's report on its face shows a 
test result of .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the blood. If the 
-2-
results are less than .082, administrative suspension can be taken under 
Utah Code Annotated 41-2-19. However, this is separate from any possible 
criminal proceedings. 
Where only drugs are involved, the department may take administrative 
action based on the officer's sworn report submitted pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 41-2-19.6. 
If the individual refuses a test, the department will take action 
as required under Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10. 
PROCEDURES 
The hearing officer or the department representative shall 
substantially comply with the requirements set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated 41-2-19.6 as amended, and more specifically, those re-
quirements contained in subparagraph five (5) of that statute. The 
hearing officer shall not be bound by formal rules of evidence or 
procedure in the administration of this hearing but shall consider all 
relevant evidence. 
The hearing shall be documented. Its scope shall cover the issues 
contained in the laws of the State of Utah, specifically, the issues 
of whether or not the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe 
the person had been operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 
41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated as amended, there was a .08% or more 
reading. The hearing officer may consider whether or not a proper 
warning was given as required by Utah Code Annotated 41-2-19.6, 
The hearing officer may take sworn testimony and shall consider 
the same, depending on its relevance. The hearing officer shall have 
-3-
discretion- in determining the relevance and appropriateness of testimony 
or other submitted documentary evidence. 
The hearing officer shall document the substance of the testimony 
or evidence presented at the hearing on forms approved by the department 
hear m) 
by typed or written notation. Tape recordings of the iaaVimg 'shall be 
made as part of the record. The hearing officer must make his findings 
and conclusions on forms approved by the department, and said decisions 
should be based on relevant evidence considered at the hearing. 
TIME OF SUSPENSION 
If no hearing is timely requested in writing, or if the driver 
fails to appear at a requested hearing, such suspension will take effect 
automatically on the 31st day after the arrest. After a hearing, an 
automatic suspension will begin on the 31st day after the date of arrest 
unless the intended suspension is overruled for a cause at a hearing 
conducted by the hearing officer of Driver License Services, Department 
of Public Safety. 
NOTICE OF SUSPENSION 
When a hearing is held, the driver will be issued an Order of 
Suspension in compliance with Utah Code Annotated 41-1-16. This order 
shall originate in the Office of Driver License Services1 administrative 
offices and will state the reason for suspension, the period of time 
the driving privilege is suspended, and in all cases will become 
effective on the 31st day after the date of arrest. 
-4-
W**** 
APPEAR PROCEDURES 
If its actions are properly appealed, the department may, upon 
request, provide to a court of record the necessary documentation to 
comply with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated 41-2-20. 
-5-
-% - > - -«f — 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
/-«y- w 
DOB: 12-02-54 
NORMAN K 9ANCERTER. COVCRNOR JOHN T. NIELSEN, COMMISSIONER 
0 . OOUGUS aoORERO, OEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
L DAIE ELTON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
RIC E WANGSGARD 
2802 W 3500 SO 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT. 84119 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
FILE NUMBER 011677860 
BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR 
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A 
PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 04 FEBRUARY 1986. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU 
IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE, IF 
ANY, AND ALL OTHER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU. 
THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 AND THAT 
A PEACE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD 
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. 
41-6-44 (DRIVING WDER THE INFLUENCE LAW). 
UTAH LAW REQUIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIVING PRIVILEGE 
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $25.00 FEE FOLLOWING 
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE 
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $25.00 
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE 
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED FOR 
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED WITHIN 20 DAYS ALL 
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR 
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT 
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT. 
IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON THE 
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS 
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED. 
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE 
COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS. PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
RESPECTFULLY YOURS, 
•86 cc: Scott R. Wangsgard 
Attorney at Law-
k059 S. kOOO W. 
W.V.C. UT 81*120 
DI 203 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, BUREAU CHIEF 
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
FEB 2 0 1986 
W V- W - . -,. 
